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Abstract
This research studied judgements and inferences on human rights across democratic and
non-democratic national contexts. It is argued that when judging dierent countries, lay
perceivers make use of representations of the country’s inhabitants. Stereotypically
democratic and non-democratic characteristics of national populations are employed as
a basis of political judgements, especially in democratic contexts. In three studies the
bases of representations of human rights’ respect and violations are investigated. In the
first study 76 subjects drew inferences on the human rights situation from formal
descriptions of countries. These are either described with a type of government (demo-
cratic or authoritarian) or with national characteristics associated to the population
(orderly and discussing or disorderly and clashing). In Study 2 (117 subjects), political
and population information are crossed. In Study 3, 126 subjects evaluated the
responsibility of the government and of the inhabitants in explaining the general situa-
tion in two positively and two negatively described national contexts. The results show
the pervasive impact of population information on political judgements. Moreover
members of non-democratic countries are viewed as accepting more human rights
violations than members of democratic countries. This attitude inference is used by
people to account for violations of human rights. Results are discussed in terms of
common sense transformation of classical political theories which are grounded on
universalism and essentialism. It is suggested that philosophical knowledge, much like
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scientific knowledge, is altered when penetrating common sense, thereby receiving
specific social and ideological functions. # 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
In the coming era of globalization people will frequently be asked to judge the political
situation in dierent national contexts. Do people base their judgements merely
on their representation of a country’s political system or also on a representation of
the characteristics of its inhabitants? Furthermore, how do these representations aect
lay perceiver’s explanations of political situations? Our studies address these two
questions by examining how people infer, on the one hand, human rights’ respect and
violations and, on the other hand, inhabitants’ attitudes towards human rights
violations in various national contexts defined by characteristics of their governments
and their populations.
So far researchers in social psychology studying the issue of human rights have
been mainly interested in individual dierences in the value and attitude structure
underlying human rights principles (Bond, 1988; Diaz-Veizadez, Widaman, Little, &
Gibbs, 1995; Stainton-Rogers & Kitzinger, 1995), in the representation of human
rights and their violations by subjects living in dierent national contexts (Cle´mence,
Doise, De Rosa, & Gonzalez, 1995; Doise, Spini, Jesuino, Ng, & Emler, 1994) and in
the use of the rights as a basis of moral and social judgement (Cle´mence & Doise,
1995). Another line of research has dealt with embedding human rights in concrete
situations. In a series of studies on the consistency of human rights’ attitudes
Moghaddam and Vuksanovic (1990) showed that people’s judgements of events and
situations involving human rights were dependent on the particular national context
wherein human rights were evoked. In a first study subjects were asked to indicate
their support for dierent human rights measures in Canada, the Soviet Union or the
Third World. Results showed that their support is larger in the two latter contexts. In
their second study various scenarios relating human rights’ violations taking place
either in Montreal, Moscow or New Delhi are proposed to the subjects. Subjects’
support towards human rights ideas was stronger when the events took place in
Moscow and New Delhi rather than in Montreal. The first aim of the present research
is to propose a more general approach to such lay conceptions of human rights in
democratic and non-democratic contexts. Secondly we will extend lay conceptions to
lay explanations by examining the attitude towards human rights people attribute to
members of dierent national populations.
Human rights were created in order to define the relationship between national
institutions—usually the government—and the inhabitants of any country in the
world. As such they are supposed to guarantee basic freedom rights for individuals
and to protect them from arbitrary and unfair treatments. Rene´ Cassin (quoted by
Madiot, 1991), one of the authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
stated: ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights defines the limits that the
omnipotent machine of the State has to take care not to exceed in its relations with
those who are subject to it’ (our translation). Yet, experts from dierent scientific
disciplines have debated the underlying concept of universality of human rights
ever since they were proclaimed in 1948 by the United Nations Organization. These
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controversies about the potential universalism of human rights, massive media
diusion as well as their political use have contributed to the emergence of human
rights as part of a widely shared knowledge, as part of our common sense. Moreover,
throughout the last 50 years, the notion of human rights has constantly been inter-
nationalized (Madiot, 1991). Through this process people in the western world are
frequently confronted with human rights issues taking place in unfamiliar and remote
parts of the world of which they possess only poor knowledge.
Transforming and Sharing Political Theories
Human rights are based on political theories. Classical liberal political theory on
which human rights are based has argued that a specific type of citizen, sharing
attributes such as independence, sense of responsibility and rationality, is essential for
the functioning of a democratic society. These features thus became the necessary
foundations of the principles underlying human rights, among them equality, free-
dom and political participation (see Benhabib, 1996). These are considered universal
characteristics of the human nature. To the extent that members of democratic
populations are seen as sharing these stable and profound characteristics, classical
political theory is based on a essentialistic view of democratic citizens.
However, much like scientific information, philosophical knowledge is transformed
when it penetrates dierent social contexts. Social representations research shows that
people transform a general and abstract knowledge into concrete or symbolic images,
figures or metaphors (Doise, Cle´mence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Moscovici, 1976;
Moscovici & Hewstone, 1984; Wagner, Elejabarrieta, & Lahnsteiner, 1995). This
objectification process operates through everyday communication and gives rise to a
dominant way of thinking about a social object. Political philosophy, even when it is
not explicitly declared as such, is frequently present in the media and everyday
discourse (Billig, 1991). Political information is often discussed by the media and in
everyday communication in a manner that can be traced back to ideas derived from
classical philosophical theories. This is the case when people put the blame of
unemployment on personality attributes of the unemployed rather than on structural
economic reasons or when they claim that ‘This population is ‘‘not yet ready’’ for a
democratic society’.
In our view people share lay political theories that help them understand and make
sense of complex issues related to human rights and other political situations
occurring in their own as well as in other countries. The essentialistic stance of liberal
political philosophy has permeated common sense. It has become part of the ideo-
logical heritage of western countries (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Human rights
are closely associated to this western value system.
Giving a Concrete Shape to Abstract Representations of Governments and Populations
Our first conjecture is that people judge and explain human rights situations by
establishing links between the representations of the population and the government
of a given country. People do not view government and population as two
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independent entities, rather they perceive them as one mirroring the other. (Western)
politicians may involuntarily illustrate the common sense assumption of an associa-
tion between the government and its population by claiming that ‘A population has
the government it deserves’. A similar conception of political justice thinking can be
applied to unfavourably as well as favourably perceived countries, although dierent
weights may be given to each of the two categories. The studies of Allison and
Messick (1985, 1987) on the group attribution phenomenon oer clear support for
the assumption of lay inferences of national group members’ attitudes and character-
istics based on a decision of the group’s leader.
In the realm of political judgements the objectification process transforms general
and abstract ideas circulating on democratic and non-democratic states into political
lay representations. If people establish an association between a population and
a government, then they should objectify and make real general descriptions of a
government as well as of a population. An easy way to give a figurative shape to a
formal description of a democratic or a non-democratic government is to replace it by
some well-known and specific country. In this domain, people share common
reference marks helping them to draw a political map of the world (seeWish, Deutsch,
& Biener, 1970). Western countries like France or the U.S.A. are seen as prototypical
democracies, whereas strongly mediatized countries like China or Iran are classified as
typical non-democratic countries. We then expect that people objectify a formal
description of a population in a similar manner. A pacifist and discussing popula-
tion should be associated with western democratic countries whereas an unruly and
quarrelsome population should be associated with authoritarian countries. Checking
this objectification process is the first aim of the present research.
Completing Lacking Information about Human Rights by Lay Political Theories
With some justification, interest is centred on human rights’ violations rather than on
their respect. As a consequence, people are frequently informed about human rights
violations in countries often unfamiliar to them. This unfamiliarity pertains as much
to governments as to populations. Lay perceivers may complete lacking knowledge
about the underlying reasons of particular human rights situations by having recourse
to general and simplified representations of democratic and non-democratic coun-
tries. Even if they have never been directly confronted with members of these little
known populations, people may feel that they know something about the inhabitants
of a given national state. By using common ideas circulating on a country or on its
inhabitants, people may give meaning to real world situations and thus compensate
for incomplete or lacking information. The scarce information people dispose of is
completed by integration in already familiar knowledge (Moscovici, 1984). New
information becomes associated with prior knowledge and is no longer dependent on
observable behaviours, events or outcomes: people do not need to perceive group
members’ behaviours in order to proceed to judgements, they rather represent them
by means of socially shared knowledge. Group perception thus becomes group
representation.
In an expert view, the explanation of the most currently denounced human rights
violations—arbitrary imprisonment, torture, limitations of freedom of expression—is
placed on governmental institutions (see for instance Humana, 1992). The population
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is seen as the victim of a government that violates human rights or that does not
guarantee protection against these violations. This expert view is consistent with the
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet we contend that lay
perceivers also take into account psychological features of the population in order to
judge human rights issues. Inferential thoughts like ‘Given the character of the
inhabitants, it’s hardly surprising that human rights are violated’ may be used to
account for a given human rights situation in a national context.
Then, like experts, people should be able to infer the human rights situation on the
basis of a description of a government. But, more importantly and contrary to
experts, people should also rely on stereotypical descriptions of a population in order
to represent the human rights situation in a given national context. The second aim of
the research was to test this hypothesis.
Attitude and Responsibility Attribution for Favourable and Unfavourable Situations
Most of the studies carried out on explanations of societal events such as poverty or
inequality have been limited to the explanation of unfavourable phenomena within a
given society (Feagin, 1972; Guimond, Begin, & Palmer, 1989; Hewstone, 1989).Much
less attention has been devoted to lay explanations of favourable living conditions.
People supposedly consider that ‘typical’ human rights violations rarely occur in
democracies. If people rely on liberal political theories, then they should account for
the perceived respect of the rights not only by invoking political and ideological
characteristics of a democratic government, but also by attributing stereotypically
democratic characteristics to members of a rights-respecting country. Hence,
members of democratic populations should be viewed as being dierent from those
living in non-democratic states on a dimension of political involvement. Because
democratic citizens themselves are part of the lay definition of human rights respect,
they should be perceived as being more supportive of human rights than non-demo-
cratic populations. We then expect that subjects of western countries should consider
that perceived attitudes towards human rights of members of a national population
are closely linked to the degree of perceived human rights violations in this national
context. That is, the more members of a population suer from human rights viola-
tions, the more they will be seen as accepting these violations, thereby originating
them at least partly. The inhabitants of a rights-respecting country, however, should
be considered to accept these violations less.
Moreover, if lay perceivers infer attitudes of the inhabitants on the basis of political
information, then responsibility of the human rights situation should be, to some
extent, attributed to the inhabitants themselves. In other words, if members of
democratic populations are perceived as being opposed to violations, then they should
be considered more responsible for the respect of human rights than the government.
This hypothesis will also be tested in this research.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES
In the present studies, subjects were invited to read a description of a national state
with either a democratic or an authoritarian government and/or a positively or
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negatively connoted national character associated to the population. In Study 1 only a
description of a government or a national character was used. Study 2 combined both
descriptions, so that the weight attributed by subjects to each of the categories could
be investigated. Study 3 again used the single descriptions.
In all the three studies, the first task consisted of giving up to three names of
countries corresponding to the description. The general procedure thus induced an
objectification process by requesting subjects to transform an abstract representation
of a national state, based on minimal political and/or population information, into a
concrete representation of a country, including their populations and their govern-
ments.
In order to enable comparisons between inferences on human rights situation based
either on a description of a government and/or a national character, subjects’ second
task was to estimate the degree of human rights respect in the context corresponding
to its description. Finally, subjects were requested to indicate the proportion of the
population who found a series of human rights’ violations unacceptable. This measure
was used to assert the perceived proportion of the population accepting dierent
human rights violations, thus blaming the inhabitants for the violations.
Study 3 was designed to specify the degree of responsibility attributed to the
inhabitants and to the political system in the explanation of the human rights situation
in a country.
STUDY 1
The aim of Study 1 was to show that a minimal description of a government and of a
population is easily translated into a specific country. A democratic description of a
government and a positive description of a population, on the one hand, and an
authoritarian description of a government and a negative description of a population,
on the other hand, should evoke the same countries for subjects. According to the
second hypothesis subjects should proceed to similar inferences on the human rights
situation when the description of the country is based either on the population or on
the government. Subjects should not only perceive more violations in a national
authoritarian system than in a democratic one, but also when the population is
negatively rather than positively described. The third hypothesis states that subjects
should perceive a relationship between the inferred attitude of the population and
perceived degree of human rights violations: a greater proportion of members of the
national population should be viewed as accepting infringements of human rights,




Seventy-six French-speaking Swiss college students participated in the study; mean
age was between 17 and 18 years. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four
experimental conditions.
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Stimulus Materials and Procedure
The study was carried out in December 1994. A computerized questionnaire was
designed by Authorware Professional Software. Subjects were informed that they were
participating in a study on human rights. All information necessary to complete the
questionnaire was provided on the screen. Subjects decided for themselves the pace of
display. The questionnaire started with two questions unrelated to human rights in
order to allow subjects to become familiarized with the computerized procedure.
The vignette method was used to create the four experimental conditions. Each
subject read a one-paragraph vignette describing the government (democratic or
authoritarian) or the population (orderly and discussing or disorderly and clashing)
of a fictitious country. Democratic (and Authoritarian) conditions read as follows:
‘Think of a country where political, economic and military power are held by dierent
(the same) persons, a country where the government takes its decisions by consulting the
population and its representatives (without consulting either the population or its
representatives)’ and Discussion (and Clashes) conditions read as follows: ‘Think of a
country in which the inhabitants are quite orderly (disorderly) and resolve their conflicts
often by discussion (clashes)’. For convenience, we will refer to these descriptions also
as positive (Democratic and Discussion) and negative conditions (Authoritarian and
Clashes). The text was kept visible throughout the entire experiment.
Subjects were first asked to give up to three names of countries corresponding to the
description.
Secondly they evaluated to what extent freedom of expression and freedom of
religion, two of the most widely known human rights, at least in Geneva (Doise &
Herrera, 1994), were respected in the country. They had to click a number on the
screen on a 1-item rating scale that ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (absolutely). In
order to enhance stability of the measure of perceived human rights violation and
respect, subjects were then asked to evaluate the diculty in exercising several actions
guaranteed by human rights. These included defence by a lawyer, freedom of settle-
ment, political asylum, foundation of a company, freedom of expression, membership
in a trade union, protection against aggression and health care. Again, scales ranging
from 1 (dicult) to 7 (easy) were used.
Finally subjects were asked to evaluate the percentage of the population of the
country rejecting dierent human rights violations. Items included work by children,
imprisonment of persons refusing to serve in the army, expulsion of foreigners
without trial, school ban for clandestine children, banning political parties and
demonstrations, censorship of TV programmes, mistreatment of prisoners, death
sentence and limitation of the number of children in a family. Subjects responded by
means of scales ranging from 1 (0 per cent) to 6 (100 per cent).
Results
Country Quotations
The first issue concerns the countries associated with the formal description of the
government or the population. Each subject could give up to three names of dierent
countries. Table 1 shows the countries associated with the description.
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As expected, subjects objectified countries in a similar way on the basis of a formal
description of a democratic government and of a discussing and orderly population.
In these two conditions they generally quoted identical western European countries.
Between the authoritarian and clashing conditions however some dierences appear:
communist or ex-communist countries are frequently associated with an authori-
tarian government and countries in a state of (civil) conflict are associated with
disorderly and clashing populations.
Estimation of Human Rights Respect
The second issue concerned the inferences on human rights respect in the country.
Reliability analysis of the two items measuring respect for freedom of expression and
religion gives a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86. A 2 (positive versus negative conditions) 2
(government versus inhabitants) ANOVAwas carried out on the mean score. Only the
main eect of positivity was significant, F(1,72) 160.8, p5 0.001, indicating that in
the two positive national contexts human rights are more respected than in the two
negative contexts (Table 2).
Eight items describing actions guaranteed by human rights were used as another
measure of perceived human rights respect. Analysis shows high reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha 0.93). The same analysis as was performed previously on the
mean score was used. Positive conditions were opposed to negative conditions,
Table 1. Countries associated (%) with descriptions, according to the experimental
conditions for Study 1
Positive Negative
Democratic Discussing Authoritarian Clashing
government population government population
Switzerland 83 83
France 72 55 4
Germany 44 27




African Countries 5 11 43 54
Middle Eastern Countries 31 70
Other Asian Countries 5 12 25
East European Countries 11 12
South American Countries 6 8
Mean frequency of evoked
countries
2.6 2.6 2.1 2.8
Number of subjects 18 18 16 24
Note. Percentages are calculated on the subjects. Other Western Countries include, in decreasing frequency,
U.S.A., United Kingdom, Andorra, Canada, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden; African Countries:
Algeria, Rwanda, South Africa, and Somalia; Middle Eastern Countries: Iraq, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan,
Palestine, Chechnya, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey; Other Asian Countries: China, Cambodia, and Vietnam;
East European Countries: Romania, Slovak and Czech Republics; South American Countries: Colombia
and Peru.
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F(1,72) 182.9, p5 0.001. Neither the dierence between government and inhabi-
tants conditions, nor the interaction eect were significant (Table 2). These results
show that subjects believe that it is more dicult to exercise dierent actions
guaranteed by the Universal Declaration in the two negative experimental conditions
and are thus consistent with our hypothesis.
Population Attitude Inference
The last prediction concerns subjects’ inferences of the attitude of the population
towards dierent human rights’ violations. For countries governed by an author-
itarian regime and inhabited by disorderly and clashing people, subjects should
perceive less opposition by the inhabitants to dierent human rights’ violations than
for countries governed by a democratic system or inhabited by orderly and discussing
people. The analysis was performed on the mean score of the 10 items describing
human rights’ infringements (Cronbach’s alpha 0.79). Again, only the main eect
of positivity is significant, F(1,72) 7.6, p5 0.01. However, a post-hoc comparison of
the means (Tukey range test) reveals that the dierence is only significant between the
discussing population and the authoritarian government conditions (Table 2).
Discussion
Study 1 provides evidence for the hypothesis that people evaluate the human rights
situation in a country not only on the basis of the type of government, but also on the
basis of the character of the inhabitants. Inferences on human rights’ respect and
violation were similar in countries described either with a democratic type of
government and discussing inhabitants or with an authoritarian government and a
clashing population. No dierences were found within the two positive and the two
negative conditions. In the democratic and orderly conditions this result may be due
to the fact that subjects mostly think of the same countries. However, in the
authoritarian and disorderly conditions subjects only partially identify the same
countries, yet inferences are identical. This finding suggests that similar representa-
tions are activated when subjects are confronted with a description of an authoritarian
Table 2. Mean scores of estimation of human rights’ respect and of population attitude










M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D.
Respect of rightsa 5.03a 1.02 5.09a 1.60 1.83b 1.08 1.79b 0.71
Exercise of rightsa 4.92a 0.90 5.01a 1.12 2.24b 0.74 2.24b 0.73
Population attitude
inferenceb
4.06 0.63 4.19a 0.55 3.62b 0.86 3.71 0.74
Note. a1, rights violated; 7, rights respected. b1, 0 per cent of the population find human rights violations
unacceptable; 6, 100 per cent find human rights violations unacceptable. Means in the same row with dierent
subscripts dier significantly at p5 0.05 (Tukey test).
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regime and a negative stereotype of a population. Indeed, both measures of human
rights’ respect led to these results. Moreover, subjects believed that members of a
discussing population, associated with a democratic western country, reject human
rights’ violations more than members of a population governed by an authoritarian
political system. This last result provides evidence for the hypothesis that people
consider the inhabitants as at least partially responsible, along with the government,
for the human rights situations in a country. In order to examine how people weight
the political system and the character of the population in their judgements of
the human rights situation, the two inferential descriptions were crossed in a second
study.
STUDY 2
The results of Study 1 do not define the relative importance of each of the two
categories as a basis for human rights’ judgements. The findings of the first study,
however, suggest that the combination of the two factors leads to two expectedly
compatible (Democratic/Discussing and Authoritarian/Clashing) and two expectedly
incompatible experimental conditions (Democratic/Clashing and Authoritarian/
Discussing). Two alternative hypotheses imply an interaction eect: on the one hand
people may reason in terms of positivity and negativity. Following the literature on
the positive–negative asymmetry in social judgements (Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979;
Van der Pligt & Eiser, 1980; Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992;
Skowronski & Carlston, 1992), we could predict that subjects will use the negative
factor more than the positive one. This assumption is supported by the work of
Skowronski and Carlston (1987), proposing that in the domain of morality, as
opposed to the domain of ability, negative information is more diagnostic. It will
therefore receive more weight and result in a negativity eect.
On the other hand subjects may give more weight either to the information related
to the political system or to the character of the population. In the first case, corres-
ponding to an expert view, the two democratic conditions should be opposed to the
two authoritarian conditions and in the latter one the two discussing conditions
should be opposed to the two clashing conditions. But the results of Study 1 show
that the population character information is sucient to allow a judgement of the
human rights situation in a given national context. Consequently the first predictions
derived from the judgmental positive–negative asymmetry are more consistent with
the hypothesis concerning the pervasive impact of population characteristics on
judgements of democratic and non-democratic countries.
Method
Subjects
One hundred and seventeen French-speaking Swiss college students participated in
the study; the mean age was 17 years. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four
experimental conditions.
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Stimulus Materials and Procedure
The study was carried out in January 1995. A traditional paper and pencil question-
naire was used. Subjects read that they were participating in a study on human rights.
The vignette method was again employed, each subject reading a two-paragraph
vignette. The text was identical to the one used in Study 1, but political and popula-
tion information were combined. Political information always preceded population
information.
Dependent Measures
Measures were identical to those used in Study 1, that is: country quotations,
estimation of the respect of freedom of expression and religion as well as of the
diculty in exercising actions guaranteed by human rights, and estimation of the
proportion of the population finding the 10 human rights’ violations unacceptable.
Results
Country Quotations
Again subjects were asked to indicate up to three countries corresponding to the
description. Table 3 gives the proportions.
Table 3. Countries associated (%) with descriptions, according to the experimental









Switzerland 82 3 3
France 39 7 3
U.S.A. 29 13 3
Other Western Countries 54 27 7 7
Ex-Yugoslavia 23 17 38
Rwanda 7 7 45
Cuba 7 17 21
Russia 4 7 17 10
Other African Countries 20 37 52




Other Asian Countries 3 37 14
East European Countries 4 10 17 10
Mean frequency of evoked
countries
2.1 1.6 2.2 2.5
Number of subjects 28 30 30 29
Note. Percentages are calculated on subjects. Other Western Countries include, in decreasing frequency,
Italy, Germany, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Greece, United Kingdom, and Vatican;
African Countries: Algeria, South Africa, Somalia, Libya, Angola, Morocco, Zaire, Cameroon, and
Senegal; Middle Eastern Countries: Iraq, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Kurdistan, Lebanon,
and Palestine; Other Asian Countries: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea (North and South),
Myanmar, and Thailand; East European Countries: Romania, Poland, and Slovak Republic; South and
Central American Countries: Colombia, Haiti, Chile, Brazil, and El Salvador.
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When a democratic type of government and a positive description of the inhabi-
tants were combined, subjects almost exclusively thought of western democracies.
Moreover the lowest quotation frequency in the Democratic/Clashing condition
(M 1.60) suggests that this combination is the most dicult one for subjects
to associate to a ‘real’ country, whereas more countries are quoted in conditions
Democratic/Discussing (2.11), Authoritarian/Discussing (2.23) and Authoritarian/
Clashing (2.45). This result shows that it was dicult for subjects to think of a
democratic country inhabited by disorderly and clashing people.
Estimation of Human Rights’ Respect
Reliability of the two items measuring respect of freedom of expression and religion
was high (Cronbach’s alpha 0.91), so that the analysis of variance could be
performed on the mean score. Independent variables were type of government (Demo-
cratic versus Authoritarian) and national character (Discussing versus Clashing).
Both variables exert a strong main eect: freedom of expression and religion are more
respected in countries governed by democratic regimes, F(1,113) 112.7, p5 0.001,
and in countries inhabited by discussing people, F(1,113) 44.4, p5 0.001. However,
the interaction eect was also highly significant, F(1,113) 37.6, p5 0.001. A
post-hoc comparison of the means showed that respect of human rights was higher in
the Democratic/Discussing condition than in the three other conditions and that the
dierence between discussing and clashing inhabitants occurred only in the demo-
cratic context (see Table 4).
Inner consistency of the eight items describing conditions guaranteed by human
rights was high (Cronbach’s alpha 0.93). ANOVA on the mean score gave a signifi-
cant dierence between democratic and authoritarian countries, F(1,107) 112.1,
p5 0.001, and between discussing and clashing populations, F(1,107) 38.0,
p5 0.001. The interaction eect was again significant, F(1,107) 11.6, p5 0.001,
revealing the same pattern of dierences as described above (Table 4).
Population Attitude Inference
The same procedure was adopted with the 10 items measuring the proportion of the
population opposed to dierent violations (Cronbach’s alpha 0.75). The two main
Table 4. Mean scores of estimation of human rights’ respect and of population attitude









M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D.
Respect of rightsa 5.77a 1.29 2.80b 1.65 1.88c 0.84 1.76c 1.09
Exercise of rightsa 5.41a 0.97 3.52b 1.42 2.65c 0.92 2.11c 0.65
Population attitude
inferenceb
4.08a 0.44 3.55b 0.67 3.44b 0.72 3.43b 0.75
Note. a1, rights violated; 7, rights respected. b1, 0 per cent of the population find human rights violations
unacceptable; 6, 100 per cent find human rights violations unacceptable. Means in the same row with dierent
subscripts dier significantly at p5 0.05 (Tukey test).
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eects are significant (type of government: F(1,113) 9.7, p5 0.01 and type of
population: F(1,113) 4.7, p5 0.05). The interaction eect between type of govern-
ment and national character was also significant, F(1,113) 4.6, p5 0.05. Discussing
inhabitants in a democratic country were perceived as being more opposed to human
rights’ violations than inhabitants in the other three contexts (Table 4).
Discussion
All three measures reveal a similar pattern of results: the Democratic/Discussing con-
dition was always opposed to the other three conditions and no dierence was found
between the two authoritarian conditions. Moreover, the condition Democratic/
Clashing was dierent from the other three conditions for the measures of human
rights’ respect. This latter result suggests that subjects expected an orderly and
discussing population in a democracy: the country was seen as respecting human
rights less, when the description of a democracy was accompanied by a negative
description of the population. The high variance of the Democratic/Clashing condi-
tion substantiates this finding, suggesting that some of the subjects based their judge-
ments more on the type of government, the other part relying more on the description
of the population.
In the case of an authoritarian state subjects recognized the responsibility of the
government for human rights’ violations, considering that the dierence within the
two authoritarian conditions was not significant. This result suggests that in negatively
perceived states the government played a more important role in the responsibility for
human rights’ violations, than in positively perceived countries. Here, the representa-
tions of the population and of the government were equally important.
Results thus revealed subjects’ belief that foremost orderly and discussing people
living in a democracy are actively opposed to human rights’ violations perpetrated by
governmental institutions. The perceived respect of human rights in the Democratic/
Discussing context suggests therefore that respect of human rights is viewed as being
closely related to the political involvement of the inhabitants. Indeed, additional
analysis revealed that in the two democratic conditions perceived political opposition
and both estimated respect of freedom of expression and religion (r 0.44, p5 0.001)
and perceived diculty in exercising actions guaranteed by human rights (r 0.49,
p5 0.001) were correlated. No significant relationship was found in the two
totalitarian conditions (rÿ0.12, n.s. and rÿ0.02, n.s. respectively).
The results support both hypotheses. First it appears that subjects reason in terms
of negativity by setting positive descriptions of a government or a population against
negative ones. However, they give more weight to the political information when the
government is negatively described. Thus, the two hypotheses must be articulated.
Subjects seem to dierentiate democratic and non-democratic political systems first
and then continue by dierentiating the positive or negative character of the popula-
tion, but only for a positively perceived political system. In other words, the repre-
sentation of respect of human rights depends on the character of the inhabitants in a
democratic country and on the political system in an authoritarian national context.
One could argue, however, that these data demonstrate an ingroup/outgroup eect
by stressing that subjects (living in a Western European country) judged more
positively a population they belong to than another one. Such an interpretation
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appears to be implausible for three reasons. First, no intergroup comparison was
manipulated in the study. Secondly, contrary to the Moghaddam and Vuksanovic
study, subjects are not induced to use human rights’ judgements aimed at preserving
or enhancing their ingroup. The third argument refers to the evaluative connotation
of democracy, consensually considered as positive. It is indeed dicult to imagine that
a non-democratic country could be perceived more positively than a democratic one.
This assumption is illustrated by the fact that governments ocially considered as
non-democratic often claim to be democratic or invoke other good reasons for
explaining their political system. The same is true for people arguing in favour of a
non-democratic country, be it their own or another one.
Likewise one could think that subjects associate their own country with a demo-
cratic country in order to give a favourable impression of it. But this is not the question
investigated here. We are rather interested in the way subjects infer characteristics of a
population on the basis of a (positive) representation of a democratic country or a
(negative) representation of a non-democratic country.
STUDY 3
A third study was conducted in order to specify to what extent the national character
of a population is used to account for a given situation in a country. Study 2 showed
that subjects take into account the national character especially in democratic
contexts, indicating that the characteristics of the inhabitants should also be used to
explain the functioning of democratic countries. In authoritarian contexts, however,
the information on the government is more important than the national character
information, so that subjects should attribute responsibility of the functioning of
authoritarian states to governments rather than to its population. This hypothesis was
tested in Study 3.
Method
Subjects
One hundred and twenty-six students of political science and international relations
participated in the study, mean age was 21 years. Subjects were randomly assigned to
the four experimental conditions.
Stimulus Materials and Procedure
The study was carried out in March 1996. A traditional paper and pencil question-
naire was used. In order to avoid specific eects of representations of human rights,
subjects were not informed that they were participating in a study on human rights,
but were told that the questionnaire was designed to investigate general issues of ‘life
in society’. The vignette method was again employed, each subject reading a one-
paragraph vignette describing either the population or the government. The text on
220 C. Staerkle´, A. Cle´mence and W. Doise
# 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 28, 207–226 (1998)
the type of government was identical to the one used in Study 1. The description of
the inhabitants however contained only a reference to the conflict resolution behav-
iour of the inhabitants (Discussion versus Clashes).
Dependent Measures
The study was designed to investigate responsibility issues as well as the perceived
content of democratic and non-democratic national characteristics. Here however we
will only report results concerning the perceived responsibility of inhabitants and the
government. As shown in Study 1, subjects readily infer the human rights situation
on the basis of the political and the national character information. In this study,
subjects were asked to evaluate to what extent (a) the ideology of the government and
(b) the mentality of the inhabitants could explain the general situation in the country.
Scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (yes absolutely).
Results
A MANOVAwas performed with the two causal items as repeated measures and the
two experimental variables (positivity/negativity and government/population) as
between-subjects factors. The two experimental conditions using the population
information induced a higher overall responsibility for the general situation of the
country than the two government conditions, F(1,122) 6.2; p5 0.05. No other
between-subjects eect was significant.
The overall within-subjects responsibility eect (inhabitants versus government)
was not significant, F(1,122) 2.6; n.s. However the interactions between respons-
ibility and the two independent factors were both significant (positivity/negativity:
F(1,122) 35.3; p5 0.001 and government/population: F(1,122) 6.0; p5 0.05).
Subjects attributed more responsibility to the inhabitants (M 5.74) than to the
government (M 5.01) when the descriptions were positive, F(1,122 8.8; p5 0.01,
and more to the government (M 6.11) than to the inhabitants (M 4.84) when the
descriptions were negative, F(1,122) 27.4; p5 0.001. When subjects read descrip-
tions of the population, no dierences appeared between the two levels of respon-
sibility, M 5.58 and 5.71 respectively, F(1,122)5 1, whereas subjects in the two
government conditions attributed less responsibility to the inhabitants (M 4.86)
Table 5. Attribution of responsibility for the general situation in a country, according to the










M S.D. M S.D. M S.D. M S.D.
Ideology of the
government
4.87 1.28 5.15 1.44 6.21 1.24 6.00 1.41
Mentality of the
inhabitants
5.53 1.25 5.94 0.97 4.19 1.57 5.48 1.71
Note. Scales: 1, not at all responsible; 7, totally responsible.
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than to the government (M 5.54), F(1,122) 7.1; p5 0.01. Finally the inter-
action between the within and the two crossed independent factors was significant,
F(1,122) 4.3; p5 0.05. In the authoritarian government condition, subjects attri-
buted more responsibility to the government, F(1,122) 37.0; p5 0.001, whereas in
the positive population condition the inverse was observed, F(1,122) 5.8; p5 0.05.
The dierences in the two other conditions did not reach a conventional level of
statistical significance (p4 0.05).
Discussion
The results confirm the hypothesis that a democratic population is seen as more
responsible for the general national situation than a democratic government.
Subjects’ explanations of the situation in authoritarian systems, however, stress
more the features of the government. Our results oer clear support for the hypothesis
of a dierentiation between explanations of human rights’ respect and, more broadly
speaking, the political situation in positively and negatively perceived national
contexts. In a negative context subjects attributed the responsibility for the situation
more to the government than to the inhabitants, whereas in a positive context they
explained the favourable political situation with the characteristics of the inhabitants
rather than with the political system.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of our studies provide evidence relevant to an understanding of the role
and importance attributed—by people living in a democracy—to democratic and
non-democratic populations and governments in political judgements of dierent
national states. In Study 1, subjects drew similar inferences from national contexts
either described as democratic or characterized by orderly and discussing inhabitants.
Likewise no dierences were found between judgements on countries with author-
itarian governments and national states described by their disorderly and clashing
inhabitants. Results of Study 2 showed that judgements on a democracy are depen-
dent on the representation people have of the population forming this democracy.
Thus, the representation of respect of human rights is considerably lower when a
democratic description is accompanied by a negative national character than when
discussing people living in a democracy.
Moreover, the first two studies showed that people infer attitudes of political
involvement, in the form of opposition to human rights’ violations, to members of a
national population not only on the basis of a description of the characteristics of the
inhabitants, but also as a function of the political system of the country. In national
contexts where subjects inferred human rights’ violations, the inhabitants were seen as
accepting these violations more than members of populations in countries that
supposedly respect human rights. In democratic contexts this group inference process
occurs as a function of perceived respect of human rights’ violations. In authoritarian
contexts, however, the correspondent inference is unrelated to the perceived level of
human rights’ respect. This result suggests that subjects dierentiate democracies with
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regard to the political involvement of their inhabitants, but view the unfavourable
human rights situation in non-democratic contexts as being independent of the
political commitment of their populations. This may suggest that non-democratic
populations are seen as being unable to exert any influence on the situation of the
country they are living in.
The third study, by demonstrating the dierent weight subjects give to the
responsibility of the inhabitants depending on the political system, confirms this
finding. In a democratic country, compared to an authoritarian one, the mentality of
the inhabitants was considered more responsible for the general situation than the
ideology of the government. The reverse is true for an authoritarian context. Thus it
seems that subjects account for positively perceived national situations with positive
national stereotypes, whereas in negatively perceived national contexts the role of the
government is given more weight.
The role of non-democratic populations in the representation and explanation of
national states is characterized by two aspects that need to be articulated: on the one
hand people judge the government as more responsible for the situation than the
inhabitants, but infer at the same time population attitudes of political passivity. It
thus seems that the authoritarian government is not seen as representative of its
population, while at the same time the government’s negative characteristics are
reflected by the inferred political attitudes of the inhabitants. These findings suggest
that both categories, the non-democratic population and the government, are
held responsible for the unfavourably perceived situation, albeit in a dierent manner.
The function and content of characteristics attributed to dierent national and
cultural groups in the explanation of global inequality calls for future research (Olson,
1997).
Finally one should note that our argument does not deny the impact of the political
and social system on characteristics shared by members of a national state. The
political culture in a given country leaves its mark on human relations, and is reflected
in its own way by national stereotypes. In our view the origin of national stereotypes is
closely related to the representation of the political system in dierent national
contexts. This may be especially true for countries about which people have only
elementary knowledge concerning their political situation and functioning.
CONCLUSION
The representation of a human rights situation in a national context is easily con-
structed on the basis of information pertaining to the political system of a country,
but also from stereotypical characteristics of the inhabitants. This finding strongly
suggests that in the realm of human rights, as well as for other political judgements
on national states, subjects associate and establish a parallel between the political
organization of a national state and its population.
More generally people would infer attributes of group members not only as a
function of a group’s decision or outcome (Allison & Messick, 1985, 1987; Allison,
Worth, & Campbell King, 1990), but also on the basis of a representation of the
decision rules in eect in the group. Thus we suggest that a representation of a group’s
decision-making process itself (democratic versus non-democratic) is used by people
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as a social inference heuristic to judge group members’ characteristics. However,
representations of group decision making are in part dependent on liberal-democratic
ideology. It would therefore be appropriate to consider the perception of author-
itarian versus democratic decision making more as a consequence of lay theories
about the group rather than as more or less accurate perceptions of the decision-
making mechanisms.
One of these lay theories is grounded on philosophical essentialism. Our results
provide indirect evidence for the assumption that people share lay political theories
based on a essentialistic vision (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Rocher, &
Schadron, 1997) of the democratic citizen. First, the clear polarization between
democratic and non-democratic populations supports this argument. Secondly, the
fact that people consider that a certain type of individual is required for the good
functioning of a democratic society indicates that this view of the person is so pervasive
that it is used as a universal standard by which all peoples of the world are judged and
evaluated. When human rights violations occur, or when a population is full of dissent
and conflict, many people may reason that such societies deny and pervert the ‘true’
inner nature of the individual. Therefore people may hold structural forces outside
the person responsible for the unfavourable situation. Democracy should thus not
be considered the natural consequence of the true human nature, as advocated by
Fukuyama (1992), but rather as a result of historical, cultural and economic factors
giving rise to inner workings of the society that finally may lead to some form of
democracy.
The often observed passivity and disengagement of westerners concerning human
rights events is quite troubling and, in a certain sense, contrary to the broad accept-
ance of human rights across political and ideological borders. One possible explana-
tion is that people, at least those living in a context supposedly respecting human
rights, adopt essentialistic explanations of democratic functioning and human
rights’ respect. These would be based on stable and inalterable characteristics of
the members of democratic populations. Nowadays democracy is not merely a
political issue, but also, and maybe first of all, a representational and ideological one.
Democracy represents a value system which transcends many aspects of social life
(Moscovici, 1992), beginning with a democratic individual necessary for the construc-
tion of a democratic society. By emphasizing the positive characteristics of the
inhabitants of democratic countries, the use of human rights can thus also be seen as a
protection and enhancement of one’s own democratic identity.
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